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Executive Summary
Since 1986 agriculture has been a major part of 
multilateral trade negotiations under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT), and since 
1995 under the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
The main objective of these negotiations is to pro­
mote free trade through disciplinary rules and 
reduction of trade-distorting policies. The Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) from 
1993 established the current disciplinary framework 
for agricultural liberalization of domestic support, 
market access, and export competition.
Domestic agricultural support is considered trade 
distorting if it is coupled to production. The 
URAA introduced a reduction commitment of 20 
percent on some types of coupled support. The 
reduction commitment was calculated on the basis 
of average support given in 1986-1988. Unfor­
tunately, these years were peak years, when world 
market prices were low and therefore agricultural 
subsidies were high. Given that not all trade­
distorting support was included in the commitment 
and that support in the reference period was 
already high, the domestic support reductions fol­
lowing the URAA have been disappointing and 
done little to open markets to more agricultural 
trade. The current WTO negotiations under the 
so-called Doha Development Agenda have not yet 
succeeded in pushing this agenda much further 
because major players like the European Union 
(EU) and the United States hesitate to make con­
cessions. But such concessions are important for 
regaining momentum in the negotiations. Develop­
ing countries represented by Brazil, China, India, 
and Malaysia, among others, hold the entire nego­
tiations in a deadlock while they wait for the EU 
and the United States to present proposals for 
serious liberalization of agriculture.
A point often ignored in the international trade 
debate is that agricultural policy is deeply inte­
grated into the domestic policy-making process. 
Agricultural policy is founded on a long series of 
historical events and conditional economic and 
political structures and institutions, which vary 
across countries. Despite external reform pressure 
from GATT/WTO and bilateral trade partners and 
internal reform pressure from increasing budget 
costs, high levels of overall agricultural support 
persist in the EU and the United States. Even 
though reforms have occurred and support has
shifted toward decoupled, and hence non-trade­
distorting, approaches, from a multilateral perspec­
tive these reforms are not enough. From a domes­
tic perspective the results are more unclear. Over­
all, free trade improves the welfare of society, but 
some agents, like farmers and agribusinesses, also 
bear costs. These costs are large per agent com­
pared with the average agent's gain. Together, these 
issues spill over into the policy-making process. At 
the end of the day, these costs create serious lobby 
pressure from farm interest groups, which make it 
difficult for the EU and the United States to 
promise serious liberalization of their agricultural 
protectionism.
Taking into account the relatively slow agricultural 
policy reform process in the EU and the United 
States, your assignment is to consider and reform­
ulate the WTO legislation on domestic agricultural 
support. The proposal must be written in terms of 
both the overall WTO objective of trade liberaliza­
tion and the domestic policy-making process.
Background
In troduction
Multilateral negotiations in the current Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) under the WTO have 
run into serious problems. With the emphasis on 
development since the 2001 launch of the DDA, 
agriculture has been one of the most sensitive 
topics on the agenda. Developing countries, led by 
nations like Brazil, China, India, and Malaysia, have 
been persistent in calling for reduced agricultural 
protectionism in industrialized countries. For 
developing countries, agriculture is crucial for eco­
nomic growth and development. Agricultural 
liberalization is therefore essential for the success 
of the multilateral approach.
Negotiations on agricultural trade liberalization fall 
into three categories: domestic support, market 
access, and export competition. Both market access 
and export competition are typical GATT/ WTO 
issues. Domestic agricultural support is a relatively 
new issue that has gained serious attention in 
recent years. In 2004 US$279,527 million were 
spent on agricultural producer subsidies in the 
countries of the Organization for Economic Coop­
eration and Development (OECD). This amount
equals 30 percent of the total value of agricultural 
production in OECD countries [OECD 2006], 
Major players on the world market, like the EU 
and the United States, are giving substantial shares 
of this support to their farmers.
The decision to support agriculture is based mainly 
on domestic conditions. Domestic producer subsi­
dies can, however, distort international markets 
when the subsidies influence farmers' choices of 
output and output level. Specifically, some types of 
subsidies give farmers an incentive to produce 
more than they would without subsidies. In this 
case, subsidies are said to be coupled to produc­
tion—the more a farmer produces, the more sup­
port he or she receives. This kind of domestic sup­
port leads to increased agricultural production and 
accordingly an increased supply of agricultural 
products on both domestic and world markets. 
This overproduction places downward pressure on 
world market prices. Domestic support can thus be 
trade distorting and is therefore an issue for dis­
cussion in WTO negotiations.
Not all types of domestic subsidies are equally 
trade distorting. Decoupled subsidies tend to have a 
smaller effect on production levels and conse­
quently on world market prices. An example of a 
decoupled subsidy would be a fixed yearly payment 
to the farmer, given regardless of what and how 
much he or she produces. A solution to the 
domestic support problem might therefore be to 
switch entirely to decoupled subsidies. It is not 
clear, however, whether this solution is politically 
feasible [and desirable). Many actors have a say in 
this issue, and many interests must be considered 
at both the domestic and the international level. 
This case study provides an analysis of this set of 
problems and the core stakeholders in the political 
decision-making process.
A Theoretical Perspective oil Decoupling:
The Economic Rationale
Perceptions on the decoupling of agricultural sub­
sidies are as varied as decoupling mechanisms. In 
order to discuss the economic rationale for 
decoupling, it is necessary to clarify the definition 
of decoupling in strict economic terms. Based on 
the work of Rausser and Foster [1987], Cahill [1997] 
was one of the first to provide a clear, simple 
definition: an agricultural subsidy is fully decoupled
if the payment does not influence the production 
decisions of farmers who receive payments and if 
the payment allows free market determination of 
prices. In other words, the subsidy must not 
change the demand and supply curves. The OECD 
[2001] operates with a looser definition of decou­
pling, called effective full decoupling, which is more 
applicable in practice. Effective full decoupling 
requires that the production level with support not 
be larger than the production level without sup­
port, as long as the market is in equilibrium. The 
response to exogenous shocks to the economy 
does not have to be identical to a zero subsidy 
response; hence the slope of the demand and sup­
ply curves can be different from a situation without 
subsidies.
From an economic point of view, effective full 
decoupling of subsidies is the ideal way to support 
agricultural production because such subsidies will 
not distort agricultural production and agricultural 
markets. As mentioned earlier, elimination of pro­
duction distortions that come from domestic sup­
port gives equal terms of competition between 
countries on the world agricultural market.1 In 
many developed countries, coupled agricultural 
subsidies elicit overproduction. Overproduction 
leads to excess supply on the world market and 
hence to downward pressure on the world market 
price. A low world market price creates a competi­
tive disadvantage for countries that do not subsi­
dize agricultural production, and the agricultural 
commodities will not necessarily be produced 
where the comparative advantage is the greatest.
Swinbank and Tranter [2004, 171] noted that the 
main economic benefit of decoupling in the 
European Union is that it "gives greater freedom 
to farm, thereby potentially reducing their [the 
farmers'] costs and increasing their profits. For the 
economy as a whole this means an increase in wel­
fare, as agricultural output is produced at lower 
cost." This argument coincides with the previous 
ones but focuses on domestic considerations. 
Decoupling gives the single farmer the freedom to 
produce the commodities that are the most profit­
able in real terms and not in terms of which
1 Leveling the playing field in principle includes elimi­
nating tariff barriers and export subsidies. If these are 
not eliminated, one can say only that elimination of pro­
duction distortions due to domestic support will give 
m ore equal terms of competition on the world market.
commodities are subsidized the most. When farm 
production follows patterns of comparative advan­
tage, it is likely to reach the highest level of pro­
ductivity at the lowest cost possible. This scenario 
is possible under a decoupled support regime, but 
it will not necessarily happen under a coupled 
support regime.
Whether a fully decoupled support instrument 
exists in practice is a point of discussion, for two 
reasons. First, decoupled agricultural subsidies have 
until now not been implemented as a sole instru­
ment anywhere. In the EU and the United States, 
decoupled instruments have been introduced as a 
part of a policy package in combination with more 
coupled instruments. In such policy packages of 
coupled and decoupled policy instruments, it is 
difficult to identify influences attributed specifically 
to decoupled instruments, especially in instances 
where such instruments widen cross-commodity 
effects. As emphasized by OECD (2001) and Gohin 
et al. (2000), it is generally important to analyze 
the impact of a whole policy package and not just a 
single instrument.
Even though most of the decoupled subsidies 
introduced so far would have no effect on produc­
tion from a marginal optimization point of view, 
some additional effects can still potentially affect 
the supply response of the single farmer. These 
effects occur because of the farmers' attitudes 
toward risk, wealth, and investment and also the
farmers' expectations about future agricultural poli­
cies (OECD 2001).
These effects are outlined in Figure I. The relative 
price effect, the quantitative restrictions effect, and 
the income effect can be analyzed in a static world 
(a world without time, risk, and uncertainty). If risk 
is included in the analysis, one can also observe 
wealth and insurance effects, and when time is 
introduced, one can analyze expectations and 
investment behavior in the long run. The workings 
of some effects are rather complicated, and note 
that the descriptions that follow here are simplified. 
Readers interested in more detail are referred to 
OECD (2001) and OECD (2005b).
The relative price effect works across different 
agricultural commodities. If one commodity is sup­
ported more than other commodities, the more- 
supported commodity's price is relatively higher 
than the prices of other commodities. This price 
difference can create a bias toward producing this 
commodity instead of other commodities. The rela­
tive price effect thereby indirectly reduces the pro­
duction of commodities that are less supported (to 
the extent that they become relatively less profit­
able to produce). In principle, decoupled subsidies 
do not have any relative price effects because the 
farmer receives the subsidy regardless of what and 
how much is produced. If decoupling is not applied 
to all supported commodities, however, relative 
price effects can still exist.
Figure 1: Coupling Effects
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If agricultural support programs put quantitative 
restrictions on output or input use, these restric­
tions directly affect the level of production. Exam­
ples of such restrictions could be milk quotas and 
land set-aside requirements. Restrictions have often 
been used to reduce the effect of increased 
production created by coupled subsidies.
The income effect basically shows that farmers' 
income level influences their choice of production 
level. If agricultural markets work perfectly and 
farmers are rational, they will produce the output 
that maximizes profits. Coupled subsidies margin­
ally affect farm profits, and farmers will choose to 
produce more than without the subsidies. Decou­
pled subsidies do not affect farmers' profits mar­
ginally and therefore do not affect production size. 
In practice, however, the agricultural labor market 
and the market for agricultural production factors 
often do not work perfectly. In these cases 
increased income from decoupled subsidies tends 
to keep farmers and production factors employed 
above optimal levels.
Increased income from decoupled subsidies also 
increases farmers' wealth. In a world of risk and 
uncertainty, this result potentially creates a wealth 
effect. Most farmers are risk averse, and several 
studies show that farmers often have decreasing 
absolute risk aversion [DARA], DARA implies that 
richer farmers tend to accept more risk and to 
produce more than less wealthy farmers [Hennessy 
1998], Therefore the wealth effect reflects the 
change in production elicited by subsidy- 
augmented wealth. Decoupled subsidies have wealth 
effects as well.
The insurance effect arises from the influence of 
agricultural subsidies on the risk level associated 
with agricultural production. Most agricultural sub­
sidies stabilize or secure a certain level of agricul­
tural income to reduce the risk of production 
[Hennessy 1998], Subsidies that stabilize income 
[such as disaster payments] generate the largest 
insurance effect. Since most decoupled subsidies 
only ensure higher income levels without stabilizing 
such income, the subsidy-induced insurance effects 
are limited [OECD 2005a],
An expectations effect plays a role in the long run. 
Farmers' expectations of future agricultural support
can affect their production decisions. A farmer 
who receives decoupled payments and expects that 
these same payments will continue for the next 10 
years will think and act differently from a farmer 
who expects a reduction of the decoupled subsidies 
over the same period. Expectations are difficult to 
measure empirically, and hence the literature lacks 
estimates of these effects [OECD 2004b],
Lastly, an investment effect exists to the extent that 
higher income, due to agricultural subsidies, leads 
to larger investments in agricultural production 
factors and in turn elicits higher agricultural pro­
duction. Whether or not the investment decision is 
affected by agricultural subsidies depends on 
whether the amount of agricultural subsidies 
received changes owing to the investment. If 
farmers receive decoupled subsidies, their invest­
ment decisions will not be affected unless some of 
the previously mentioned effects would also lead to 
increased investments. If farmers borrow money to 
make investments, their receipt of agricultural sub­
sidies also enhances their credit ratings [OECD 
2005a],
Researchers have thoroughly investigated some of 
the coupling effects using different modeling 
approaches, and also more empirically in the case 
of the United States. Because of lack of adequate 
data on the implementation of the 2003 reform of 
the EU's Common Agricultural Policy [CAP], 
empirical estimates from the EU vary in magnitude 
and quality, giving ambiguous results for the 
effects of decoupled support. Even though some 
production effects are likely unavoidable, decoupled 
support instruments do appear, however, to gener­
ate milder effects than coupled instruments.
Following Cahill [1997], researchers started to 
measure the production effect of support instru­
ments by the degree of decoupling. Degree of 
decoupling relies on the assumption that a support 
instrument is fully coupled to production [gives the 
maximum production effect] if it consists of price 
support, and it is fully decoupled if it has zero 
effect on production. On an index ranging between 
zero and one, a degree of decoupling of zero indi­
cates a fully coupled subsidy and a degree of one 
indicates an effective fully decoupled subsidy. The 
degree of decoupling can be derived by dividing 
the production effect of the support instrument
AO(subsidy)by  the production effect of an
equivalent price increase AQ (price} and sub­
tracting it from one [OECD 2001],
A Q ( subsidy)
Degree of decoupling = 1------------------ -—
A 0 ( price)
The degree of decoupling can exceed unity, sug­
gesting a negative subsidy-induced production 
effect. It is a rather simplified way of measuring the 
degree of decoupling since measuring the degree of 
decoupling for single instruments is questionable. 
As noted earlier, the effect of a whole policy 
package is important and far more complicated.
Some of the subsidies used in the EU and the 
United States can be placed on the degree of de­
coupling scale approximately as shown in Figure 2.
Set-aside requirements are not agricultural subsi­
dies, but they are worth mentioning because they 
are often closely linked to agricultural subsidies. 
Introduced separately, they are likely to elicit a 
negative production impact. Likewise, subsidizing 
one commodity can have a negative production 
effect on other commodities [cross-commodity 
effect] [OECD 2003], Area payments based on his­
torical entitlements are the type of payments 
introduced with the Single Payment Scheme in EU,
which is described later. Because these payments are 
broadly defined as decoupled payments, they are 
currently permitted by the WTO. Animal 
premiums and area payments with planting 
requirements are generally considered partially 
decoupled subsidies. They are not completely inde­
pendent of production level because the payments 
are on a per planted hectare basis. They are also, 
however, not completely dependent on production 
levels because farmers will achieve no gain in subsi­
dies by maximizing yields. Price support is generally 
considered the most coupled agricultural subsidy 
because the farmer is subsidized for the entire 
amount of the commodity produced through a 
higher price. Price support tends to induce over­
production because higher production generates 
larger subsidy payments. The same mechanism 
exists with the U.S. deficiency payments.
When agricultural subsidies are decoupled, the dis­
tortions and inefficiencies in producer and con­
sumer markets are eliminated—this is the economic 
rationale for decoupling. It is probably not possi­
ble, however, to construct the ideal decoupled sub­
sidy in reality because a range of coupling effects 
tend to influence farmers' choice of production. 
Yet decoupled subsidies have a much smaller pro­
duction impact than more coupled subsidies, and 
from an economic point of view, decoupled subsi­
dies appear preferable.
Figure 2: Different Agricultural Subsidies Placed Loosely on a Degree o f Decoupling Scale
0 Price support, deficiency payments
Animal premiums, area payments (with planting requirements of 
specific crops)
1 Area payments based on historical entitlements (no planting 
requirements)
▼ Set-aside requirements
Source: Based on authors' evaluation of OECD 2001.
Producer Subsidies and Decoupling in the 
European Union
For many years, the core element of the CAP has 
been price support. To secure food supplies and 
farm income, a customs union was created in the 
late 1950s to facilitate free agricultural trade 
between the member states. All products were 
governed by individual market organizations with a 
set of institutional prices and an intervention 
mechanism that secured an artificially high 
European market price. As already described, price 
support generates a zero-value degree of decou­
pling and is therefore potentially very production 
distorting and trade distorting.
During the 1970s and 1980s, increasing problems 
occurred. The EU budget swelled as high prices led 
to overproduction. Budget outlays went to market 
intervention and export subsidies. During the 1980s 
the EU tried several steps to limit overproduction, 
such as by introducing quotas on milk and sugar. 
Overall overproduction continued, however, and 
pressure to reform the CAP emerged both from 
inside the EU and from the outside world in the 
GATT trade liberalization negotiations.
This internal and external pressure to reform the 
CAP also brought about the conclusion of the 
MacSharry Reform in 1992. The reform reduced 
price support to a wide range of agricultural 
products. As a compensation for the lower prices, 
hectare and animal premiums were introduced. 
Hectare premiums were paid for agricultural land 
planted to certain crops. They vary each year 
according to the size of the subsidy-entitled land. 
The hectare premium is not directly coupled to the 
level of production, but it can only be paid to land 
that is under cultivation. In the late 1990s the 
MacSharry Reform was deepened with the Agenda 
2000 Reform [European Commission 1999], Price 
support was further reduced, and producers were 
compensated with a rise in the size of hectare and 
animal premiums. On a degree of decoupling scale, 
the support that was converted to hectare and 
animal premiums has a higher degree of decoupling 
than does price support and should therefore be 
less production and trade distorting.
Current WTO negotiations began in 2001, and a 
future agreement will potentially put new demands 
on domestic support. Also the expansion of the 
EU from 15 to 25 countries increased internal EU 
demands to rethink the CAP. In 2002 Agricultural
Commissioner Franz Fischler revealed an entirely 
new CAP reform proposal as a part of the midterm 
review of Agenda 2000. Even though some mem­
ber countries were highly critical of the proposal, 
in July 2003 they agreed on a compromise, which 
was implemented in January 2005 [Council Regula­
tion [EC] no. 1782/2003].2 Part of EU agricultural 
support is now given as a decoupled subsidy called 
the Single Payment Scheme. The Single Payment 
Scheme broadly covers cereals, durum wheat, rice, 
potato starch, dried fodder, and cattle. Since 2005, 
reforms of EU sugar and oilseed policy have 
followed the same line of change.
The Single Payment Scheme sets farmer subsidies at 
the same amount annually regardless of production. 
The decoupled payments require that farmers 
comply with a range of requirements on good agri­
cultural and environmental conditions and other 
statuary management requirements. Collectively, 
these requirements are called Cross Compliance. 
The implementation of the Single Payment Scheme 
varies noticeably across the member countries, 
because different implementation options were pos­
sible. Therefore the CAP has become far more 
complex than previously.
Figure 3 illustrates the composition of EU support 
from 1986 to 2005. Price support clearly domi­
nated until the MacSharry Reform in 1992. There­
after other coupled subsidies, specifically hectare 
and animal premiums, gradually increased, and by 
2005 a noticeable share of these subsidies were 
converted to decoupled support under the Single 
Payment Scheme. Results of the sugar reform are 
not discernible until 2006, and in some countries 
the Single Payment Scheme has not been fully 
implemented yet. Figure 3 shows that although the 
latest CAP reform introduced substantial changes, 
coupled subsidies and price support continue to 
make up the principle component of EU farm sub­
sidies. Only part of the support has been changed 
to less distorting forms.
2 Council Regulation [EC] no. 1782/2003 of September 
29, 2003, established common rules for direct support 
schemes under the Common Agricultural Policy, estab­
lished certain support schemes for farmers, and amended 
regulations.
Figure 3: Composition of Support Given to EU  Agricultural Producers, 1986-2005
□  Market price support ■  Coupled support ■  Decoupled support □  Other support
Source: O E C D  2006.
Note: The categories of support are from the standard O E C D  producer support estimate categories as follows: Market price 
support = market price support Coupled support = payments based on output + payments based on area planted. 
Decoupled support = payments based on historical entitlements.
Other support = payments based on input use + payments based on input constraints + payments based on overall farming 
income + miscellaneous payments. The category "other support" contains much support given on environmental and other 
objectives, and the coupling effect of these subsidies is not always clear.
The EU is still far from having a completely 
decoupled farm subsidy scenario. On the other 
hand, the agricultural policy changes so far are in 
line with WTO requirements for domestic support. 
Price support has been reduced, and most of the 
hectare and animal premiums have been changed 
into decoupled payments, which are allowed under 
the WTO [Jensen and Zobbe 2006].
Producer Subsidies and Decoupling in the 
United States
Since the first farm support program in 1933, the 
overall objective of government intervention in 
agriculture has been income protection for U.S. 
farmers. Current agricultural policy in the United 
States is governed by the Farm Security and Rural 
Investment Act of 2002. Three of the 2002 Farm 
Bill's instruments relate to commodity subsidies: 
loan rate programs, decoupled direct payments, 
and countercyclical payments. The most commonly 
used type of loan rate is the loan deficiency pay­
ment, which is a product-specific minimum price 
that will secure farmers' income in case of collap­
sing world market prices. The loan rate size is
governed by provisions in the 2002 Farm Bill. If 
the loan rate is higher than the world market price, 
the farmer will be compensated for his loss. The 
decoupled direct payment is a non-product-specific 
payment to each farmer every year based on his­
torical production and income. The central 
mechanism in the countercyclical payments is the 
target price. This price is fixed in the legislation, 
and it constitutes a desirable level of income. The 
government pays the producer the difference 
between the target price and the higher of the 12- 
month-average market price or the loan rate plus 
the per-unit direct payment. This countercyclical 
payment is non-product-specific and based on his­
torical production data [Knutson et al. 2004], To 
sum up, in a good year farmers receive only direct 
payments, and in a bad year they can receive all 
three types of support.
The current 2002 Farm Bill has evolved from an 
array of successive farm bills. Historically, U.S. farm 
policy has gone through three phases. First, full- 
scale government intervention in agriculture was 
introduced as a major part of the New Deal legisla­
tion stemming from the farm crisis of the 1920s
and early 1930s, when farm prices and income fell 
relative to nonfarm prices and income. The policy 
mix introduced through the Agricultural Adjust­
ment Act of 1933 included supply controls com­
bined with price support, loan rate programs, and 
direct payments. Because of the very detailed 
supply control, a nationwide administration was set 
up to enforce and control the legislation.
Second, following a social welfare debate in the 
1960s, the composition of large shares of producer 
support changed radically from price support to 
deficiency payments. This change became mani­
fested in the 1973 Farm Bill. The debate in the 
1960s had dealt with two issues. One problem was 
the lack of flexibility in the support system. The 
traditional fixed price support failed to reflect 
changes in world market prices, and in turn implied 
unchanged consumption levels. The other issue 
related to a social-ethical problem: because poor 
consumers spend relatively more of their income 
on food than wealthy consumers do, they are more 
affected by the burdens of price support.
The third phase is the fundamental shift in the 
philosophy of agricultural intervention that took 
place in 1996. The 1996 Farm Bill, titled the Federal 
Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act, abol­
ished supply controls, decreased the loan rates, and 
moved the bulk of producer support from 
deficiency payments to decoupled direct payments.
Decoupling is not a new issue in farm policy in the 
United States. The concept of coupled and 
decoupled support was discussed surrounding the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (Nourse et al. 
1937], Furthermore, decoupling was a subject of 
debate in discussions surrounding the 1947, 1973, 
and 1985 farm bills, but at the end of the day, the 
political will to decouple support was not there. In 
1996 the Congress and the Clinton Administration 
did what previous sessions could not agree upon. 
The traditional coupled deficiency payments were 
changed into decoupled payments based on histori­
cal data on production and income.
To examine this change, it is important to look at 
the political system. Historically, political ideology 
and economic principles have tended to collide. 
Since President Franklin D. Roosevelt launched the 
New Deal in 1933, the Democrats have generally 
favored supply control and tended to promote 
coupled support. The Republicans, on the other 
hand, never really liked the idea of a state agency 
that controlled overall farm production. This is by 
no means to say that Republicans are against farm 
support, but they tend to favor more decoupled 
policy instruments that allow the market to play a 
larger role in agricultural production. According to 
Paarlberg and Orden [1996], the midterm election 
of 1994 explains a major part of the policy change 
in 1996. In that election the Republicans gained 
control of both chambers in Congress. Until then, 
the Democrats had controlled at least one of the 
two chambers since 1955. This new situation, 
together with a globalization-friendly president in 
the White House and high commodity prices, 
helped pave the way for the 1996 Farm Bill.
The current 2002 Farm Bill succeeded the 1996 
Farm Bill and must be evaluated as an adjustment of 
the previous act. With regard to decoupling, one 
issue in the 2002 Farm Bill has overshadowed other 
issues. The 2002 legislation allowed farmers to 
update their area base data stated in the 1996 legis­
lation. This provision was problematic because it 
creates a link between current production and 
future producer subsidies, hence coupling support 
and production decisions. The reason for this pro­
vision lies in biotechnical research. New research 
had extended the growing area for corn and soy­
beans north to North and South Dakota, where 
decoupled payments were being calculated based on 
their historical grain crops. Allowing the farmers to 
update their base data was seen as a way of secur­
ing a fair distribution of support between all U.S. 
farmers. The composition of U.S. support from 
1986 to 2005 is shown in Figure 4. The bulk of 
support is still given as coupled support, and in fact 
only a fraction is decoupled.
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Source: O E C D  2006.
Note: The categories o f support are from the standard O E C D  PSE categories as follows: Market price support = market 
price support. Coupled support = payments based on output + payments based on area planted -  disaster payments. 
Decoupled support = payments based on historical entitlements. Other support = payments based on input use + payments 
based on input constraints + payments based on overall farming income + miscellaneous payments. The category "other 
support" contains much support given for environmental and other objectives, and the coupling effect of these subsidies is 
not always clear.
Policy Issues
From an overall welfare economic point of view, 
the first best solution would be to restrict the 
government's role in agriculture to correcting 
market failures. This approach would secure the 
most optimal allocation of the factors of produc­
tion. If government, for some reason, is unsatisfied 
with the income distribution generated through the 
marketplace and wants to redistribute income to 
the farmers, the first best solution would be cost- 
free lump-sum transfers. In effect this solution 
would mean historically based, decoupled payments 
with minimal influence on production and hence 
trade. In practice the international and domestic 
discussion on agricultural subsidies is more compli­
cated, and the economic agenda is difficult to 
adopt.
International Policy Issues
The international focus on agricultural subsidies 
dates back to 1982, when the OECD adopted the
so-called trade mandate. The aim was to analyze the 
possibilities for gradually reducing agricultural pro­
tectionism and for including agriculture in the mul­
tilateral trade system. A framework was established 
to analyze agricultural policy and the impact on 
international trade. In 1986 the OECD began to 
measure agricultural support in member countries. 
The measure used is called producer support esti­
mate [PSE] and is basically a monetary estimate for 
the support transferred to producers. Figure 5 
reports PSE as a percentage of the value of agricul­
tural production for the European Union, the 
United States, and the OECD. After years of work, 
the OECD report National Policies and Agricultural 
Trade was released in 1987. It served as a key input 
to the Uruguay Round negotiations [1986-1993] 
under GATT [Coleman and Chiasson 2002]. This 
was the beginning of a new agenda in international 
agricultural policy and of an institutional develop­
ment whose effects we still observe today.
Figure 5: Share o f PSEs in Total Value o f Production, 1986-2005
Pet. PSE
Source: O E C D  2006.
The URAA established the disciplinary framework 
for domestic agricultural support in GATT/WTO 
member countries by categorizing support into 
three boxes: an amber box with trade-distorting 
support; a blue box with production-coupled sup­
port combined with production-constraining pro­
grams; and a green box with decoupled support 
programs. The URAA introduced reduction com­
mitments on the amount of domestic support 
allowed in the amber box, while assistance in the 
blue and green boxes was exempt from reduction 
commitments. In the amber box, an aggregate 
measurement of support [AMS] was defined as an 
indicator of the amount of trade-distorting sup­
port. The developed countries agreed on a 20 per­
cent reduction commitment on the total AMS [and 
the developing countries agreed on 13 percent] in 
the URAA from an initial historical base of domes­
tic support. The reduction commitments on the 
most distorting subsidies in the amber box have, so 
far, not been so tight that any member country has 
reached the binding limit. In principle, all produc­
tion-coupled support should have been cut, but 
because of the exemption of the blue box and a 
historical base period reflecting high initial support 
levels, cuts to domestic support following the 
URAA have been rather disappointing.
Green box subsidies are defined in the WTO con­
text as decoupled subsidies. They are considered to 
be minimally production- and trade-distorting, and 
these policies are generally permitted. The WTO 
guidelines for classifying policies into the green box
concern primarily policy design rather than directly 
specifying the level of production and trade distor­
tion allowed [Frandsen et al. 2002], The definition 
listed in Annex 2, Article 5 of the URAA is as 
follows:
Decoupled income support
[a] Eligibility for such payments shall be 
determined by clearly defined criteria 
such as income, status as a producer 
or landowner, factor use, or produc­
tion level in a defined and fixed base 
period.
[b] The amount of such payments in any 
given year shall not be related to, or 
based on, the type or volume of pro­
duction [including livestock units] 
undertaken by the producer in any 
year after the base period.
[c] The amount of such payments in any 
given year shall not be related to, or 
based on, the prices, domestic or 
international, applying to any produc­
tion undertaken in any year after the 
base period.
[d] The amount of such payments in any 
given year shall not be related to, or 
based on, the factors of production 
employed in any year after the base 
period.
[e] No production shall be required in 
order to receive such payments.
The policy design requirements only allow subsidy 
types with very modest effects on production and 
trade. There will be no direct link between support 
and production size, and these types of subsidies 
will typically be in the high end of the degree of 
decoupling scale. In both the EU and the United 
States, substantial changes in agricultural policy 
have taken place since the conclusion of the 
URAA. One of the drivers of these reforms has 
been the international debate on liberalizing world 
trade.
Domestic Policy Issues
Arguments for decoupling producer subsidies are 
more straightforward in an international context 
than in a domestic one. In many OECD countries, 
including the EU and the United States, agricultural 
policy is part of domestic redistributive economic 
policy. Historically, agricultural support was under­
taken because of the so-called farm income prob­
lem, which states that farm income is more 
unstable and decreases relative to nonfarm income 
over time [Gardner 1992). Today the rationale for 
the subsidies is far more blurred. It is probably a 
combination of the farm income problem and a 
fear of what would happen if the subsidies were 
truly decoupled or removed. Decoupling could 
result in financial stress partly because the subsidies 
have been capitalized in the land values and the 
values of other production factors and partly 
because it could potentially lead to large changes in 
the location of agricultural production through a 
market-based specialization and division of labor.
From a government point of view three issues are 
of concern when agricultural policy issues are dealt 
with. After a decision to support farmers' income 
is made, the first issue is the choice of policy 
instrument. Although various instruments can be 
chosen, we focus on three: price support, defi­
ciency payments, and direct decoupled payments. 
Each instrument has various characteristics and 
efficiency levels. Their only common characteristic 
is that they transfer money from society to 
farmers. The transfer efficiency is determined by 
transfer loss such as distortion costs and transac­
tion costs [OECD 1995],
Price support is mainly paid by the consumers 
through an artificially high price. This high price 
provides support for the farmers and gives them 
incentives to increase production. To be effective, 
price support is often combined with an inter­
vention mechanism to stabilize the price and with 
tariffs to protect domestic farmers from world 
market competition. If a country is a net importer, 
this approach results in national tariff revenue, and 
if the country is a net exporter, it results in export 
subsidies paid by the taxpayers. Administratively, a 
price support is easy and cheap to operate because 
it can be managed through the food-processing 
industry.
Deficiency payments are paid by taxpayers. The 
farmers plan their production on the basis of a 
politically defined target price. This higher price 
gives farmers an incentive to increase production. If 
the country is a net exporter, the deficiency pay­
ment in principle works as an open-ended export 
subsidy as well. The operation of a deficiency pay­
ment scheme depends heavily on administrative 
control. Every farmer needs to be taken into 
account because the level of support depends on 
the actual harvest, and this implies high administra­
tive costs.
In theory, direct decoupled payments have no 
influence on production. Direct decoupled pay­
ments are taxpayer financed, but because of the 
nature of direct decoupled payments, the cost of 
administering such a scheme is smaller than for the 
deficiency payments. Once direct decoupled pay­
ments are calculated, the same amount of support 
is paid to each farmer annually.
The initial choice of policy instrument or policy 
mix is fundamental in the long run because history 
has shown that in this area there is a high degree 
of path dependency. The choice is based on issues 
like the objective of the policy, administration 
skills, ideology, structure of the agricultural sector, 
and openness of the economy.
When producer subsidies are implemented, every­
thing is not equal. After the choice of policy 
instrument, the second relevant issue is the trade­
off between farm support policy and other eco­
nomic policies. The most obvious is fiscal policy 
because of the costs of subsidies. If farm subsidies 
increase there are two approaches to cost: the
budget can be increased, or other costs can be 
decreased. Agricultural policy also spills over into 
other policy areas, which must be considered. 
These areas include rural development policy, envi­
ronmental policy, labor policy, tax policy, social 
policy, foreign policy, aid policy, and trade policy. 
How these areas are handled comes down to 
governments' preferences about which policy areas 
should have the greatest weight. In both the EU 
and the United States, agricultural producer subsi­
dies appear to be ranked extremely high.
The third and likely the most important issue con­
cerns navigating the unstable waters of the political 
decision-making process. U.S. agricultural policy 
evolves from a consensus between the White 
House and Congress. Traditionally Congress [the 
Senate and the House of Representatives] have had 
the initiative in this matter. In the United States 
there also exists a very tight relationship between 
the civil servants in the U.S. Department of Agri­
culture [USDA], the politicians in the two congres­
sional committees on agriculture, and the leaders of 
the national farm organizations. This relationship is 
often referred to as the "Iron Triangle" and can be 
found in many nonfarm policy areas as well. In 
farm policy, this triangle is influential for two 
reasons. The practice of electing two senators from 
each state grants a relatively high degree of political 
power to the agricultural states of the Midwest and 
the South. The result is a powerful Senate agricul­
tural committee whose influence goes far beyond 
farm policy. The other reason for the successful 
Iron Triangle is related to the historical ties 
between the USDA and the agricultural sector, 
which go back to the 1860s. The New Deal and the 
creation of the Agricultural Adjustment Adminis­
tration in 1933 strengthened these ties even more 
through the build-up of local branches across rural 
America. The details of supply control administra­
tion ensured a tight relationship between farmers 
and civil servants.
In the EU, agricultural policy is made through a 
complicated decision-making system that consists 
of the Council of Ministers, the European Commis­
sion, the European Parliament, and various interest 
groups. The Council of Agricultural Ministers deals 
with the Common Agricultural Policy [CAP], All 
member countries are represented on the council, 
and their attitudes toward the CAP reflect national 
interests. Behind every minister there exists a
sovereign country with a separate political decision­
making system. Because of the CAP's status as a 
supranational policy, there is a voting procedure 
that both respects the rights of the majority and 
protects the rights of the minority. The Council of 
Agricultural Ministers, however, has traditionally 
stressed consensus. The European Commission is 
the government of Europe, and on CAP issues it 
has the initiative. In practice, this means that the 
Commissioner of Agriculture prepares and 
presents proposals for the Council. If the Council 
opposes a proposal, it is up to the commissioner to 
navigate and repropose. The role of the European 
Parliament with regard to CAP is to either adopt 
or reject the total budget for the European Union.
Historically the farmers of Europe have had a great 
interest in the CAP and have exercised their inter­
ests through COPA [Committee of Professional 
Agricultural Organisations in the European Union], 
an organization made up representatives of national 
farm organizations in the EU. COPA has both 
formal and informal influence on the decision­
making process. Over the years, other interest 
groups in the areas of consumer rights, environ­
mental protection, and developing countries' rights 
also have shown interest in the CAP. Besides lob­
bying on a European level, farm and other groups 
also lobby on the member state level. The influence 
of the farm lobby on politicians varies across coun­
tries, but in member states like France, Greece, and 
Poland, among others, governments are highly 
influenced by farm conservatism, which of course 
spills over into European decision making.
Stakeholders
Many groups and institutions have interests in EU 
and U.S. domestic support policies. These interests 
vary widely and add to the complexity of domestic 
support policies. Trade partners can be divided into 
two groups—those who benefit and those who lose 
from EU and U.S. domestic support. Agricultural 
exporters like Australia and New Zealand have an 
interest in promoting support policies that do not 
distort trade. The fact that coupled agricultural 
subsidies create overproduction followed by excess 
world supply, lower world market prices, and lower 
import demand affects exporting countries nega­
tively. Some developing countries, especially least- 
developed countries like those in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, have preferential access to the European
and American markets. One example is the Every­
thing but Arms [EBA] initiative launched by the 
EU. This initiative gives least-developed countries 
[LDCs] tariff- and quota-free access to high-price 
European markets with exceptions for a few goods.
The reduction of price support results in prefer­
ence erosion for the LDCs with preferential access 
to European and U.S. markets. Countries with such 
preferences are therefore interested in keeping the 
status quo rather than changing the agricultural 
subsidies into less-distorting forms with no price 
effect on agricultural products.
As an international organization that works toward 
liberalizing world trade, the WTO is also a stake­
holder in the issue of domestic agricultural support 
policies and their effects on world trade. Different 
interests are at stake on the international scene, 
and an unambiguous solution to the domestic sup­
port issue is not easy to find.
Domestically, price support is financed by 
consumers and taxpayers. The former group pays a 
higher price for agricultural products, and the lat­
ter group pays for price-supporting facilities like 
intervention mechanisms and export subsidies. Both 
coupled and decoupled direct support are financed 
by taxpayers. In the case of a large economy, defi­
ciency payments can benefit the consumer because 
overproduction depresses prices on the world 
market. These groups of consumers and taxpayers 
are very heterogeneous. The amount of money 
transferred to farmers from a single consumer or 
taxpayer is relatively marginal. Many consumers are 
not aware that they support farmers though food 
prices. Therefore substantial consumer opposition 
to agricultural subsidies is relatively unlikely. Con­
sumer interest groups exist, but they are most 
often focused on other specific issues like food 
safety and environment.
The farm interest groups have much stronger 
interests at stake, both nationally and inter­
nationally. The degree of influence that farm lob­
bies exercise on farm policy formation varies across 
countries. Farmers often view decoupled payments 
as social welfare payments to which they are gener­
ally averse. Farmers are also aware that direct sub­
sidies are much more visible to the public. Whereas 
consumers may hardly notice higher food prices, 
direct subsidies are much easier to quantify when
they are visible as huge expenses on the common 
European Union budget and on the federal budget 
of the United States. This visibility makes it easier 
for both politicians and interest groups to target 
them and demand reductions. Farm interest groups 
often receive support in lobbying for coupled sup­
port by the upstream and downstream industries. 
The capitalization effects of support also affect 
agribusiness, and future liberalization of support 
could create financial stress in the short run and 
change demand and supply in the primary sector in 
the long run through serious structural adjust­
ments.
As already mentioned, an increasing number of 
other interest groups are showing an interest in 
agricultural policy. Among these are environmental 
groups seeking to reduce agriculture's negative 
influence on environment, animal welfare groups 
focusing on agriculture's intensive use of animals, 
and groups focusing on rural development and on 
growth and rights of developing countries. All 
these groups have many issues at stake regarding 
agricultural policies and agricultural subsidies, com­
plicating the process of reforming agricultural poli­
cies in the EU and the United States. A change 
toward using more decoupled subsidies is not as 
simple as it seems in theory.
Policy Options
Since the 1982 implementation of the OECD Trade 
Mandate and the inclusion of agriculture in multi­
lateral trade negotiations in 1986, report after 
report has shown that liberalization of domestic 
agricultural policy, hence producer subsidies, 
should be a part of the solution. Under both the 
Uruguay Round [1986-1993) and the Doha Devel­
opment Round [2001-?), discussions about dis­
ciplining and reducing domestic support have 
gained much attention in the international debate. 
Despite this attention from economists, politicians, 
and the media, the actual results are rather disap­
pointing, as shown in Figures 3, 4, and 5. Some 
changes have occurred in the composition of the 
support, but a radical shift toward decoupled 
support is not discernible.
This slow progress despite the attention indicates a 
problem in multilateral trade negotiations. Four 
policy options can be identified. First, abolishing 
the consensus rule in WTO could change the
dynamics of the negotiations and make reaching an 
agreement easier. Second, instead of centering on 
broad rounds, negotiations could focus on specific 
issues to be agreed upon separately. Sensitive issues 
could thus be avoided. Third, agreeing on the 
status quo would mean that there will be no more 
negotiations on domestic support. The Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture would then 
stand as permanent legislation. Fourth, instead of 
following the old agenda on domestic support in 
the WTO, a new one could be developed. These 
four policy options will be explored in more detail.
The first two options both relate to the organiza­
tion of the WTO. The benefit of changing the con­
sensus rule to some kind of voting procedure 
would be to abolish the de facto veto right of all 
member states. This approach would change the 
dynamics of negotiations because countries with 
inflexible positions on, for instance, domestic agri­
cultural support, would lose influence. One of the 
problems would be to design a voting procedure. 
How would the weight attached to each country be 
decided? Should it be based on geographical size, 
population, GDP size, or trade volume, and what 
about the balance between developed countries and 
developing countries? Another even more serious 
problem could be that countries would leave the 
WTO for fear of losing control and sovereignty. 
Such an outcome could jeopardize all that both the 
GATT and WTO have achieved over the years.
The benefit of moving away from the concept of 
broad rounds of negotiation would be to concen­
trate all the administrative and technical expertise 
of the WTO and the member states on one issue at 
the time. A working agenda like this would allow 
the WTO to step out from the shadows of GATT 
and unfold its potential as an organization. A 
problem with this approach is that the whole idea 
of broad rounds allows for winners and losers for 
each topic discussed. The negotiation of many dif­
ferent topics at the same time increases the possi­
bilities for trade-offs, and hence for reaching an 
agreement. The more fundamental problem with 
these first two policy options is that they will 
change the spirit and the overall atmosphere of the 
multilateral trade negotiations that have developed 
since 1948.
The third policy option is to abolish the negotia­
tions on domestic agricultural support. The URAA
would then stand as permanent legislation. The 
benefit of doing so would be to cut off negotia­
tions on a politically sensitive area where progress 
is limited. Additionally, it would move focus to the 
other two areas of agricultural negotiation under 
the WTO: market access and export competition. 
According to a study by Anderson and Martin 
[2006], the potential benefits of trade liberalization 
in agriculture will come mainly through increased 
market access. This finding supports a shift in focus 
from domestic subsidies to market access. There 
are at least three problems with this policy option. 
First, the area of market access is by far the most 
sensitive area in agricultural negotiations, and at the 
end of the day a trade-promoting agreement would 
still be far away. Second, it is no coincidence that 
the negotiations on agriculture are divided into 
domestic support, market access, and export com­
petition. The three areas are deeply linked. For 
example, domestic price support needs to be com­
bined with strict border controls to be effective. 
Third, the URAA is far from a perfect agreement. 
One of its problems is that allowed producer sub­
sidies are based on the average support given in 
1986-1988, a period when the world market price 
was seriously depressed and consequently tariffs 
and agricultural subsidies were high. As a result, 
members like the European Union and the United 
States are left with rather flexible support commit­
ments.
The discussion of the first three policy options 
leads to the fourth one. Domestic support is an 
important area of discussion in the WTO, but the 
slow progress in current negotiations indicates the 
need for an adjustment of the agenda set by the 
URAA. This adjustment should incorporate exist­
ing knowledge from the URAA, knowledge about 
coupling and decoupling support on both a 
theoretical and a practical level, and knowledge 
about the domestic policy-making process.
Assignment
Taking into account the relatively slow agricultural 
policy reform progress in the European Union and 
the United States, your assignment is to consider 
and reformulate WTO legislation on domestic agri­
cultural support. The proposal must be written in 
terms of both the overall WTO objective of trade 
liberalization and the domestic policy-making 
process.
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